Binance hack
About $6.3 billion stolen, the largest crypto theft on record.
Every incident is pinned to the Bitcoin block of its date. The timeline shows when it happened and how much was lost. The strip below it shows the same incidents block by block, oldest on the left.
Log scale: each gridline is ten times the one below.
The coloured fill is the loss: a quarter of the block is $10M, half is $100M, three quarters is $1B. Its colour is the bracket.
Drag the strip, or click and drag on the timeline.
An incident appears here once we have read a primary source for it and pinned it to a real block. More are added as they are checked.
| Date | Incident | Lost | Type | Block | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 29 Oct 2026 | Binance hack | $6.3B | Exchange | 973,732 | Report |
| 24 Sep 2026 | Bitget hack | $388M | Exchange | 968,436 | Report |
| 18 Sep 2026 | Zcash rally | – | Market | 967,551 | Report |
| 8 Aug 2026 | BIP-110 chain split | – | Consensus | 961,632 | Report |
| 30 Jul 2026 | Coldcard entropy flaw | $111M | Hardware | 960,183 | Report |
| 21 Feb 2025 | Bybit | $1.5B | Exchange | 884,724 | Short report |
| 16 Oct 2024 | Radiant Capital | $53M | Key Compromise | 865,929 | Short report |
| 18 Jul 2024 | WazirX | $235M | Exchange | 852,707 | Short report |
| 31 May 2024 | DMM Bitcoin | $304M | Exchange | 845,859 | Short report |
| 20 May 2024 | Gala Games | $21.8M | Key Compromise | 844,339 | Short report |
| 22 Nov 2023 | HECO bridge and HTX | $99M | Bridge | 817,930 | Short report |
| 30 Jul 2023 | Curve pools (Vyper bug) | $69M | Smart Contract | 800,901 | Short report |
| 3 Jun 2023 | Atomic Wallet | $100M | Wallet | 792,613 | Short report |
| 13 Mar 2023 | Euler Finance | $197M | Flash Loan | 780,597 | Short report |
| 11 Oct 2022 | Mango Markets | $110M | Market Manipulation | 758,110 | Short report |
| 6 Oct 2022 | BNB Chain Token Hub | $80M | Bridge | 757,398 | Short report |
| 20 Sep 2022 | Wintermute | $160M | Key Compromise | 754,900 | Short report |
| 1 Aug 2022 | Nomad bridge | $190M | Bridge | 747,548 | Short report |
| 23 Jun 2022 | Harmony Horizon bridge | $100M | Bridge | 741,978 | Short report |
| 17 Apr 2022 | Beanstalk | $181M | Flash Loan | 732,272 | Short report |
| 23 Mar 2022 | Ronin bridge | $545M | Bridge | 728,655 | Short report |
| 2 Feb 2022 | Wormhole | $326M | Bridge | 721,523 | Short report |
| 27 Oct 2021 | Cream Finance (October) | $130M | Flash Loan | 706,940 | Short report |
| 30 Aug 2021 | Cream Finance (August) | $18.8M | Flash Loan | 698,230 | Short report |
| 10 Aug 2021 | Poly Network | $610M | Bridge | 695,090 | Short report |
| 26 Oct 2020 | Harvest Finance | $33.8M | Flash Loan | 654,311 | Short report |
| 25 Sep 2020 | KuCoin | $275M | Exchange | 649,966 | Short report |
| 27 Nov 2019 | Upbit | $50M | Exchange | 605,545 | Short report |
| 7 May 2019 | Binance (7,000 BTC) | $41M | Exchange | 575,013 | Short report |
| 14 Sep 2018 | Zaif | $60M | Exchange | 541,320 | Short report |
| 19 Jul 2017 | Parity multisig wallets | $26M | Smart Contract | 476,522 | Short report |
| 17 Jun 2016 | The DAO | $66M | Smart Contract | 416,653 | Short report |
| 28 Feb 2014 | Mt. Gox collapse | $379M | Exchange | 288,189 | Short report |
About $6.3 billion stolen, the largest crypto theft on record.
$387.5 million stolen.
ZEC went from about $50 to about $1,480 by 18 September 2026.
2.53% of miners signalled; the chain split.
1,719+ BTC swept from wallets.
On 21 February 2025 about $1.5 billion in ether and ether-based tokens left one of Bybit's cold wallets in under three minutes. It was the largest crypto theft on record until Binance in October 2026. The FBI says North Korea did it.
Bybit kept the funds in a wallet that several people must approve together, run through a tool called Safe{Wallet}. The attackers first broke into the computer of a Safe{Wallet} developer. From there they changed the code of the web page Bybit's signers used. The page showed a routine transfer. What the signers really approved handed control of the wallet to the attacker. Safe says its smart contracts were not at fault.
At 14:13:35 UTC the wallet accepted the disguised transaction. At 14:16:11 UTC four sweeps emptied it into one address: 401,346.77 ETH, 90,375.55 stETH, 15,000 cmETH and 8,000 mETH. Five days later the FBI said the thieves were swapping the assets into bitcoin and spreading them over thousands of addresses.
No key was stolen and no contract was broken. The weak point was the screen people trusted when they signed. Checking what a transaction really does, on a separate device, is the lesson large wallet operators took from it.
Totals run from $1.4 billion to $1.5 billion depending on the prices used. The FBI says approximately $1.5 billion; our Binance report uses $1.46 billion.
On 16 October 2024 more than $53 million was drained from Radiant Capital's lending markets on BNB Smart Chain and Arbitrum.
Radiant's contracts were controlled by a multi-signature wallet that needed 3 of its 11 signers. Rekt reported that the private keys of enough signers were compromised. With them the attacker took control of the lending markets. Rekt reported users being warned to revoke the spending approvals they had given the protocol.
We verified one of the attacker's transactions on BNB Smart Chain, mined at 17:11:00 UTC. Rekt reported $16 million already gone from the BNB Smart Chain market when the first warning went out, and over $53 million in total.
Three signatures out of eleven is a low bar for control of everything. It was Radiant's second loss of the year.
On 18 July 2024 the Indian exchange WazirX lost about $235 million from a single multi-signature wallet on Ethereum.
WazirX said the wallet had six signers: five of its own and one at Liminal, its custody provider. Rekt reported that the signers used hardware wallets and that payments were limited to approved addresses. The attackers did not send a payment. They got the signers to approve an upgrade that replaced the wallet's code with a version they controlled, and then emptied it.
On the chain we counted 202 calls to the wallet from one address that day, the first at 06:19:23 UTC. WazirX said the attacker's contracts had been created eight days earlier and had not touched the wallet until then.
The signers approved something other than what they believed they were approving. Bybit lost $1.5 billion the same way seven months later.
On 31 May 2024, 4,502.9 bitcoin left a wallet of the Japanese exchange DMM Bitcoin in a single transaction. We read it on the chain: one output of exactly 4,502.9 BTC, mined at 04:12:49 UTC.
The sources we read do not say how the wallet was opened. Rekt reported that the exchange noticed the bitcoin leaving its hot wallet at about 13:30 Japan time, roughly a quarter of an hour after the block was mined.
At that day's prices, $66,584 to $69,025, the bitcoin was worth $300 million to $311 million. The exchange suspended some services and said customers' bitcoin deposits were guaranteed.
One transaction took about a third of a billion dollars from a licensed exchange in Japan, six years after Coincheck lost over $530 million there. Keeping customer assets offline protects only the assets that are actually kept offline.
On 20 May 2024 someone with control of an administrator address created 5 billion new GALA tokens, worth about $216 million on paper, and began selling them. They sold 592 million for $21.8 million before the address was blocked.
The GALA token contract lets certain privileged addresses mint new tokens. Rekt described the cause as an access control failure: an address with that privilege was under someone else's control. No bug in the contract was needed.
We read the mint on Ethereum: 5,000,000,001 GALA created at 19:32:11 UTC and sent to one address. Rekt reported the tokens being sold for ether in batches until Gala blacklisted the address.
The headline number is what was created, not what was lost. The real loss was what buyers paid for tokens that should never have existed, about a tenth of the headline.
$216 million (tokens created) or about $21.8 million (tokens sold). We use the second.
On 22 November 2023 two linked businesses were hit within an hour: $86.6 million left the bridge of the HECO chain and $12.5 million left hot wallets of the exchange HTX, formerly Huobi.
Rekt reported that the bridge was drained through a compromised operator account, an account with the authority to release funds from it. The exchange's hot wallets then sent funds directly to separate attacker addresses, which points to their keys being compromised as well.
We read the attacker's address on Ethereum that day: 42.11 million USDT arrived at 10:04:23 UTC and 489 HBTC three minutes later, and 10,000 ETH was already being sent onward at 10:06:59. Rekt's list of the bridge losses adds SHIB, UNI, USDC, LINK and TUSD.
It was the fourth incident in three months at projects linked to the same owner, twelve days after the exchange Poloniex lost $126 million. Both attacks went through accounts that could move funds on their own.
On 30 July 2023 several Curve Finance pools were drained of about $69 million. The pools' own code was not at fault. The compiler that had turned it into machine code was.
The pools were written in a language called Vyper and used its built-in lock against reentrancy, the trick of calling a contract again before it has finished. In three old versions of the Vyper compiler that lock did not work across two functions. An attacker could re-enter between adding and removing liquidity and withdraw more than their share.
We verified one of the exploit transactions, against the pETH pool, mined at 13:10:35 UTC: it moves about 86,000 ETH through the pool in a single transaction. Rekt listed Alchemix ($20.5 million), Curve's own CRV pool ($24.2 million) and Metronome ($1.6 million) among the losses.
Audits read the source code. Nobody was checking that the compiler kept the promise the source code made. Any pool holding native ETH and built with versions 0.2.15, 0.2.16 or 0.3.0 was exposed.
On 3 June 2023 users of Atomic Wallet began reporting that their funds had been sent out without their consent. Elliptic later put the total at over $100 million, with one victim losing $8 million.
Atomic Wallet is an app in which users hold their own keys. The company said less than 0.1% of its users were affected and that none of the possible causes it examined had been confirmed. In the statement we read it did not say how the keys were exposed.
There is no single theft to point to. Rekt reported the first drains just before 22:00 UTC on 2 June. The company said it had brought in the investigators Chainalysis and Crystal and was passing victims' reports to them.
Self-custody removes the exchange as a point of failure. It does not remove the software. When a wallet app is the weak point, every user who trusted it is exposed at once and nobody is obliged to make them whole.
On 13 March 2023 an attacker took $197 million from Euler Finance, one of the better-established lending protocols on Ethereum, in a handful of transactions.
Euler tracked deposits and debts with two kinds of tokens and liquidated an account when its debt outweighed its deposits. A function added the year before let a user donate deposit tokens to the protocol's reserves, and it did not check whether the donor's account was still healthy afterwards. The attacker used it to create an account that owed more than it held, and profited from the way the protocol then liquidated it.
We verified an exploit transaction mined at 08:50:59 UTC. Rekt, citing SlowMist, counted 86,000 in ether derivatives ($134.6 million), 849 WBTC, 34 million USDC and 8.9 million DAI.
The function had been reviewed by auditors. One of them, Sherlock, accepted responsibility for missing the flaw and paid Euler a $4.5 million claim. A missing solvency check in a rarely used function was enough.
On 11 October 2022 a trader took more than $110 million out of Mango Markets, a trading platform on Solana, by pushing up the price of its own token and borrowing against the inflated value.
According to the complaint filed by the US regulator CFTC, the trader opened two anonymous accounts and used them to build large leveraged positions in a swap whose value followed the price of MNGO. He then bought large amounts of MNGO on the three exchanges that fed Mango's price source. The reported price rose more than thirteen-fold in thirty minutes, and he used the inflated positions as collateral to withdraw the assets other users had deposited.
The complaint says over $110 million was withdrawn, most of what users had deposited, and that the trader later returned about $67 million and kept about $47 million. Rekt put the platform's shortfall at $115 million and noted that the trader's starting capital, about $5 million, had come from the exchange FTX.
Nothing was hacked in the usual sense. The platform did what its code said with the prices it was given. The CFTC called it its first case of oracle manipulation.
Over $110 million (CFTC), $114 million or $115 million in other counts.
On 6 October 2022 an attacker tricked the bridge between BNB Beacon Chain and BNB Smart Chain into creating 2 million BNB, worth about $570 million. Most of it never left the chain. Validators paused the network, and Binance estimated that $70 million to $80 million got out.
The bridge released coins on one chain when it received a mathematical proof that they had been locked on the other. BNB Chain says the attacker forged that proof by exploiting a flaw in a shared code library. The bridge then believed a deposit had been made and paid out BNB that did not exist.
The forged withdrawal we verified was mined at 18:26:46 UTC. BNB Chain then contacted its validators one by one, 26 active at the time, and halted the chain. Binance said most of the funds stayed on BNB Smart Chain, out of the attacker's reach, and that about $7 million of what had left was frozen.
A chain that a few dozen validators can stop on request limited this loss. That is also the uncomfortable part, because it showed how centralised the chain was. The headline number was never the real loss.
$566 million to $586 million is the value of the 2 million BNB that was created. The loss is what left the chain: $70 million to $80 million by Binance's estimate that night. Later statements put it nearer $100 million; we did not read them.
On 20 September 2022 the trading firm Wintermute said it had been hacked for about $160 million in its DeFi operations, and that its other businesses were not affected.
Rekt reported that the firm's hot wallet was probably compromised through a vanity address, a custom-looking address made with a tool called Profanity that was known to be vulnerable. Whoever can rebuild the private key of such an address can act as its owner.
We verified one transfer to the attacker's address: 6,919.7 ETH at 05:41:35 UTC. The firm's chief executive gave the total as about $160 million and said the vanity address had been used to save transaction fees.
The key was never leaked or phished. It was weak from the moment it was created, because of the tool that made it.
On 1 August 2022 the Nomad bridge was emptied of about $190 million in two and a half hours. It was not one thief. Once the first withdrawal worked, hundreds of people copied it.
The bridge was supposed to release funds only for messages that had been proven valid. After an upgrade in June, an empty value was accepted as a trusted proof, so every message counted as proven. Anyone could take a successful withdrawal, replace the receiving address with their own and send it again.
We verified a transaction that shows the flaw at work: a call to the bridge's process function at 21:32:31 UTC that released 100 WBTC. Rekt counted about $190 million drained in total, including $4 million taken by one address that said it was acting to protect the funds.
No skill was needed after the first transaction, which is why it became a crowd. The bug was a single default value set during a routine upgrade.
On 23 June 2022 about $100 million in ether and tokens was withdrawn from Horizon, the bridge that held the Ethereum-side assets of the Harmony chain.
The bridge released funds when two of its five signers approved. Rekt reported that the keys of two signers were compromised, which was all the attacker needed. The withdrawals were then ordinary, correctly signed bridge transactions.
We verified one of them: at 11:06:46 UTC a signer confirmed a transaction that sent 13,100 ETH from the bridge to the attacker's address. At that day's prices, $1,044 to $1,153, that was about $14 million to $15 million of the total.
The bridge held nine figures behind two signatures. Three months after Ronin lost $545 million the same way, the lesson had not yet been applied here.
On 17 April 2022 an attacker voted to give themselves everything Beanstalk held, and the vote passed. Rekt counted $181 million taken from the protocol, of which the attacker kept about $76 million.
Beanstalk was governed by its users: whoever held enough of its tokens could pass a proposal. A proposal with a large enough majority could be executed immediately. The attacker submitted a proposal to transfer the treasury, then borrowed enough with a flash loan to hold that majority for one transaction, voted, executed and repaid the loan.
The whole attack is one transaction, mined at 12:24:16 UTC. In it we read about a billion dollars of borrowed stablecoin tokens moving in and out. After repaying the loans the attacker had 24,800 WETH, about $76 million. A second proposal sent $250,000 to a Ukraine donation address.
The vote was valid by the protocol's own rules. A governance system that counts borrowed money, and acts without delay, can be bought for the length of one block.
$181 million or $182 million is what left the protocol; about $76 million is what the attacker kept after repaying the loans.
On 23 March 2022 an attacker took 173,600 ether and 25.5 million USDC from the bridge that connects Ronin, the network behind the game Axie Infinity, to Ethereum. Ronin noticed six days later, when a user could not withdraw 5,000 ETH. The United States blames North Korea.
The bridge paid out when five of its nine validators signed. Four were run by Sky Mavis, the company behind the game, so one more signature was enough. The attacker got it through an arrangement made in November 2021, when the Axie DAO let Sky Mavis sign on its behalf to handle heavy traffic. That permission was still usable. With five signatures the withdrawals looked legitimate to the contract.
We read both withdrawals on Ethereum: 173,600 WETH at 13:29:09 UTC and 25.5 million USDC at 13:31:04 UTC, two minutes apart, to one address. At that day's prices this was about $545 million. When the theft was announced on 29 March it was put at about $624 million. The US Treasury later sanctioned the mixer Blender for processing more than $20.5 million of the proceeds.
Nine validators sound like a lot. Five keys within reach of one company's systems are not. The theft also showed how long a bridge can sit empty before anyone looks.
$545 million at the prices of 23 March 2022 (our calculation from ETH at $2,970 to $3,036); about $624 million at the prices of 29 March, when it was announced (Rekt).
On 2 February 2022 an attacker made the Wormhole bridge create 120,000 wrapped ether on Solana that nothing backed, then used part of it to withdraw real ether on Ethereum. Rekt valued the loss at $326 million.
A bridge mints tokens on one chain when its guardians sign that the same amount was locked on the other. On Solana the attacker got past that check without any guardian signing, by presenting a set of signatures created in an earlier transaction of their own.
We verified the first withdrawal on Ethereum: 80,000 WETH at 18:28:37 UTC through the bridge's completeTransfer function. The bridge's team publicly offered the attacker $10 million to return the funds. They then said ether would be added to restore the backing.
Users of the wrapped token lost nothing only because the bridge's backers replaced $326 million. The code that failed was a signature check, the one thing a bridge exists to do.
On 27 October 2021 Cream Finance was drained of about $130 million, another loss that year and by far the largest.
Cream accepted a Yearn vault token as collateral and valued it from the vault's own numbers. The attacker used flash loans of about $2 billion and two addresses that lent to and borrowed from each other in a loop, which built up a huge position in that token. They then changed the value the vault reported. Cream believed the collateral was worth about $3 billion and let the attacker borrow everything it had.
The attack was a single transaction, mined at 13:54:10 UTC. In it we read 500 million DAI being borrowed and hundreds of millions in Yearn tokens moving between the two addresses.
Each piece worked as designed. The loss came from stacking them: a lending market that trusted a price which a large enough borrower could set.
On 30 August 2021 an attacker borrowed far more than their collateral allowed from the lending protocol Cream Finance and left with about $18.8 million.
Cream had listed a token called AMP. When AMP is transferred it notifies the receiver, and the receiver can run code at that moment. The attacker borrowed AMP, and inside that notification borrowed again before Cream had recorded the first loan. This is reentrancy, the same class of bug that emptied The DAO in 2016.
The transaction we verified, mined at 05:44:47 UTC, starts with a flash loan of 500 WETH used as collateral and moves 19.48 million AMP. Rekt reported the stolen ether, worth just over $18 million, still sitting in the attacker's address that day.
The lending code was sound for ordinary tokens. Listing one token with an unusual feature was enough to open it.
On 10 August 2021 someone took about $610 million in tokens from Poly Network, a service that moves assets between blockchains. It was the largest theft in decentralised finance at the time. Within a day the attacker began sending the money back, and nearly all of it was returned.
A bridge holds users' tokens on one chain and releases them when it receives a valid message from another chain. Poly Network's contract on Ethereum checked those messages against the key of a trusted party called the keeper. The attacker found a way to make the contract replace the keeper's key with their own. After that the contract treated the attacker's messages as valid and paid out.
The first attacker transaction we verified on Ethereum was mined at 09:48:40 UTC, and a second followed at 09:51:02. Funds were also taken on BNB Smart Chain and Polygon. A day later about $260 million had come back. The rest was moved into a wallet that needed approval from both the attacker and Poly Network before it was released.
A bridge is only as safe as the rule that decides who may speak for it. Here one function could rewrite that rule. The money came back because the attacker chose to return it, not because anything stopped the theft.
Reports give $600 million to $612 million, depending on the prices used.
On 26 October 2020 an attacker took about $33.8 million from two of Harvest Finance's stablecoin pools in a series of rapid trades, each one profitable by less than 1%.
Harvest worked out what a deposit was worth from the current price in a Curve pool. The attacker borrowed $50 million with a flash loan, a loan that must be repaid in the same transaction, and used it to push that price out of line. They deposited at the wrong price, let the price snap back, and withdrew more than they put in. Then they repeated it.
The transaction we verified was sent from the attacker's address that Rekt names and mined at 02:53:58 UTC. It moves about 50 million USDC and 18 million USDT through the pool in one go. Rekt put the total at $33.8 million; other counts say $24 million.
A flash loan lets anyone be rich for one transaction. Any protocol that trusts a price which can be moved inside that transaction is offering its deposits to whoever notices.
$33.8 million (Rekt) or $24 million, depending on whether the returned amount is subtracted.
On 25 September 2020 the hot wallets of the exchange KuCoin were emptied of bitcoin, ether and a long list of tokens. Chainalysis put the total at more than $275 million.
KuCoin said that bitcoin, ERC-20 tokens and other coins in its hot wallets had been transferred out, and that it was still looking for the cause. Hot wallets are the online wallets an exchange uses to pay withdrawals, so they must hold keys that software can use.
On Ethereum we found an address that received 1,994 ETH at 18:48:59 UTC, then 8,709 ETH and 13.9 million USDT nineteen seconds later, with other tokens following. That is sixteen minutes before the time KuCoin gives for the first large withdrawals, and we take it to be the thief's address. Chainalysis counted 1,008 BTC and 19.8 million USDT among the stolen assets.
Hot wallets have to hold keys that software can use, because withdrawals cannot wait for a person. That convenience was the only thing between a thief and $275 million.
On 27 November 2019, 342,000 ether moved in a single transaction to an address with no history. It is the amount reported stolen from the South Korean exchange Upbit that month. We read the transaction on Ethereum, mined at 04:06:41 UTC.
We have not read Upbit's own account, so this report does not say how the wallet was opened. What the chain shows is one ordinary transfer signed by the wallet's key. Whoever sent it had the key or could instruct the system that held it.
At that day's prices, $141 to $156 per ether, the 342,000 ETH was worth $48 million to $53 million.
A single signature moved an exchange's entire ether hot wallet. Nothing on the chain can tell a theft from an authorised transfer; that distinction exists only inside the company.
On 7 May 2019 Binance said hackers had withdrawn about 7,000 bitcoin from its hot wallet in a single transaction. We read that transaction: 7,074.18 BTC, mined at 17:17:18 UTC.
Binance said the attackers had collected a large number of user API keys, two-factor codes and possibly other information, using phishing, viruses and other methods. They then structured the withdrawal so that it passed the exchange's security checks.
Binance said this was the only affected transaction and that it touched only the bitcoin hot wallet, which held about 2% of its bitcoin. At that day's prices, $5,688 to $5,975, the 7,074 BTC was worth $40 million to $42 million.
The attackers did not break Binance's wallet. They gathered enough stolen logins to look like many ordinary customers at once. Seven years later the same exchange lost $6.3 billion in a different way.
Tech Bureau, the company behind the Japanese exchange Zaif, said that on 14 September 2018 someone broke into the server that managed its hot wallets and sent out about 6.7 billion yen in bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash and MonaCoin.
An exchange keeps part of its customers' coins in hot wallets, which are online so withdrawals can be processed quickly. Tech Bureau said the server that controlled those wallets was accessed from outside between 17:00 and 19:00 Japan time. It gave no technical detail in the statement we read.
Of the roughly 6.7 billion yen, Tech Bureau said about 2.2 billion was its own and about 4.5 billion belonged to customers. At roughly 112 yen to the dollar that is about $60 million. The exact number of coins had not been confirmed when the statement was written.
The loss came from the part of an exchange that has to stay online: the server that manages its hot wallets. About two thirds of what was taken belonged to customers.
On 19 July 2017 an attacker emptied wallets built with Parity's multi-signature wallet code. We verified two transfers to the attacker's address, 44,055 ETH and 82,189 ETH, five minutes apart.
A multi-signature wallet needs several owners to approve a payment. In this version of the wallet, the function that sets the owners could be called again by anyone after the wallet was created. One of the transactions we verified is a call to that function, initWallet. The attacker made themselves the owner and then simply paid themselves.
The two transfers we read total 126,244 ETH. At that day's prices, $194.74 to $227.01, that was $24.6 million to $28.7 million. There may have been more; we count only what we verified.
The wallets' owners did nothing wrong. A function meant to run once had been left open to anyone, and it guarded tens of millions of dollars.
On 17 June 2016 someone began draining The DAO, a fund that held ether for its investors and paid it out by code. By the time it stopped, about 3.64 million ether had moved into a copy of the fund that the attacker controlled.
The DAO let an investor leave and take their share. The code sent the ether first and updated the investor's balance afterwards. The attacker's contract asked to leave, and while the payment was still in progress it asked again, and again. The Ethereum Foundation called it a recursive calling vulnerability. Today it is known as reentrancy.
We verified a transaction from that morning, mined at 03:34:48 UTC, that moves The DAO's tokens. The address the Ethereum Foundation named as the attacker's child DAO later held as much as 3,642,408 ETH. At that day's prices, between $15.65 and $20.99, that was $57 million to $76 million. The Foundation noted the attacker could not withdraw it for about 27 days.
It is the bug every smart contract developer learns first: update your records before you send money. The attacker never needed a key. The contract did exactly what it was written to do.
The dollar figure depends on the hour: ether fell from about $21 to under $16 that day.
Mt. Gox was the largest bitcoin exchange of its day. On 28 February 2014 it filed for court protection in Tokyo and said about 850,000 bitcoins had disappeared: roughly 750,000 belonging to customers and 100,000 of its own. Three weeks later it found about 200,000 of them in an old wallet, which left about 650,000 missing.
There is no single break-in to point to. The company said that at the start of February 2014 someone abused a bug in how bitcoin transfers were handled, and that it believed the coins were stolen that way. It said the full extent was not yet known. It also found a gap of about 2.8 billion yen between customers' cash deposits and what was in the bank.
At about $583 per bitcoin on the day of the filing, 850,000 BTC was worth about $496 million and 650,000 BTC about $379 million. The 200,000 recovered bitcoins became the estate that creditors are paid from. In October 2026 the trustee said most repayments to creditors who had completed the procedure were done, and extended the deadline to 31 October 2027.
Customers learned that coins left on an exchange are a claim on a company, not coins in hand. Many waited more than ten years for part of their money. It is the case people still cite for holding your own keys.
Often quoted as $450 million to $480 million. The figure depends on the day's price and on whether the 200,000 bitcoins found later are counted.
The short reports are researched and drafted with AI assistance. Every item under "What we checked" was read from the chain or from the linked document, and what we could not check is listed. How we work. Logos are trademarks of their owners and are shown only to identify the companies involved; entries without a logo show initials.